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IN OTHER PUBLICATIONS

Marriage Courts

An interesting and provocative editorial
entitled "Bottleneck in Marriage Cases" by
Reverend Albert Bauman, O.S.B., is featured in the March 1964 issue of the St.
Joseph magazine.
Observing first that perhaps the most
urgent of all needed reforms in the Church
concerns the interminable delays in marriage courts, both diocesan and Roman, the
editorial asks - who is to blame?
Father Bauman points out that the first
thing to note is that the delays do not necessarily occur in Rome. In fact, the feeling
among canon lawyers is that the difficulties
can very seldom be blamed on officials in
Rome. When cases are properly presented,
decisions are quick and easy. It is the cases
which require correspondence with the parties concerned and with priests and officials
in chancery offices that run on for months
and even years. When new evidence is required, it has to be rounded up by busy
priests who have a hundred other things on
their minds. Sometimes those involved are
hard to find, and reluctant to testify when
they are finally found.
The Church is very careful about marriage cases. When the divine law is involved
and when a sacrament is in question, great
care must be taken to base every decision
on the best possible presentation of all the
facts in the case.
In the opinion of Father Bauman, it

would be an immense benefit to all concerned if there were more experts in the
canon law of marriage. Perhaps a greater
effort could be made to train men for this
exacting work. They might even be laymen,
if enough can be found who are interested
and willing to take on the work.
To carry this idea a step further he suggests the possibility of having law offices
that specialize in this type of case. A corps
of lay and/or clerical experts in marriage
law might help to clear up the backlog of
cases that is said to exist. Then they could
relieve overburdened diocesan offices of
much of the grief connected with marriage
cases.
Discreet advertising in publications for
the clergy would soon get the word around,
and a full-time practice might be built up.
Of course, expenses of lay attorneys would
go up, too, but not more than expenses for
other legal proceedings.
Such an office of canon law specialists
in various phases of the marriage law of the
Church could be a boon to the chancery
offices of small dioceses. Small dioceses
could avoid altogether the expense of sending priests to universities for advanced
studies in canon law. In these small dioceses,
even after the priest is trained, he rarely
gets enough work to keep up in his field.
When a case is presented he has to work
twice as hard as the man who is continually
handling this type of work.
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Another development which could case
the whole situation considerably would be
the establishment in the United States of a
special marriage court to try cases that
would ordinarily have to be sent to Rome.
This, Father states, could save time and
effort all around. This suggestion is not as
revolutionary as it may sound. Since 1947
(and before 1933) Spain has had its own
court of appeals for many so-called "Roman
cases:" a local Rota (as the Roman marriage court is called) to save the trouble of
appeals to the highest tribunal in Romeexcept for extraordinary cases.
Father Bauman concludes that lay people
would still have the right to appeal to Rome,
as they have now, when they feel they are
not receiving justice where they live. This
is, of course, a last resort and should not be
used lightly.
The laity already have the right to go to
any priest who will present their case, or
to any attorney. An experienced attorney
might be of considerable help. At least he
would be familiar with some of the legal
procedures and the laws of evidence. Perhaps he might get interested enough to specialize in canon law, as some laymen already
do.
There is plenty of business. Of all the
legal tangles people get themselves involved
in, marriage cases are one of the most common. In many of these cases the eternal
salvation of souls is at stake and they need
all the help they can get.
Obscenity
The frequently heard argument that pornography and obscenity have not been established medically as being necessarily
harmful to a minor was answered recently
by Dr. Nicholas G. Frignito, Medical Director and Chief Psychiatrist of the County
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Court of Philadelphia. Dr. Frignito made
his refutation in an address delivered to the
East Orange, New Jersey Decent Literature
Committee on January 21 of this year.
Dr. Frignito said, in part, that in the years
1949 to 1959, the Philadelphia County
Court had a rise in the number of its cases
which was greater than the total number
of cases in the almost half century since the
court's beginning in 1917. Represented in
the increase are more sexual offenses, offenses of physical assault and other public
indecencies.
In the Criminal Division, the total number of cases rose from 3,687 in 1949 to
5,555 in 1959, an increase of 50 per cent.
Fornication, bastardy cases and neglect to
support illegitimate children rose from
1,173 to 2,590 or 120.8 per cent. In 1949
in the Juvenile Division, there were 22,251
cases and in 1959 a total of 32,003 cases,
a rise of 43.8 per cent.
In the Misdemeanor Division, dealing
with the young adult, disorderly street walking and related sex offenses, vagrancy,
drunkenness, indecent assault, rape, exhibitionism, promiscuity and other sexual offenses, men's cases rose from 859 in 1949
to 1,364 in 1959, an increase of 55.5 per
cent. These figures are comparable with
other community reports. In too many in-

stances, the increase in sexual offenses can
be attributed to the persistent and constant
exposure and use of obscene matter in all
forms.
Many of the delinquents coming to the
attention of the court for repeated truancy,
incorrigibility, robbery, larceny, burglary,
carrying concealed and deadly weapons are
avid readers of crime stories, masochistic
and fetishistic magazines, obscene comic
books and lewd stories.
Delinquents are more frequently involved

IN OTHER PUBLICATIONS

with eroticism than others. More than 50
per cent admit to heterosexual experiences,
sexual promiscuity and 24 to 30 per cent
admit homosexual contacts. Delinquent
boys and girls begin homosexual and heterosexual activities in their early teen years.
The most singular factor inducing the
adolescent to sexual activities is pornography: the lewd picture, the smutty storybook,
the obscenely pictured playing card, indecent films, the girlie magazines. All these are
readily available to children from the
seventh grade into high school. Such items
can be purchased from older persons in
school areas, local stores or newsstands.
Pornography fosters impure habits and desires. Physical damage frequently results
from sexual misconduct. In the Philadelphia area, venereal disease has increased
approximately 300 per cent in the past five
years. It is not difficult to imagine the devastating effect on the intellectual, emotional
and moral development of these victims.
According to Dr. Frignito, pornography
can cause sexually aggressive acts and in
some instances lead to the slaying of the
victim. This is particularly true when delinquents have been erotically stimulated by
smut books devoted to flagellations, sadism
and masochistic rituals. The court records
verify this.
The increase in sexual offenses among
adults, especially homosexuality, is directly
attributed to the availability of magazines
devoted exclusively to this perversion. This
type of book is openly displayed on newsstands and magazine racks.
The incidence of incestuous assaults is
much higher than reported. Psychiatrists,
physicians, social workers, police and other
authorities charged with the care of girls
know this. Approximately 30 per cent of
institutionalized adolescent girls were so

abused, and many revealed that the offending parent or sibling regularly read smutty
books or had lewd photographs.
Dr. Frignito concludes that it is absurd
and fallacious to say eradication of pornography is suppression of sex knowledge, or
that smut reading is a practical and sage
outlet for the sexually aggressive who would
otherwise act out their inclinations. The
reading of erotica is not a harmless psychological aphrodisiac; it is a serious danger to
the community. Pornography is a scheme of
avaricious and depraved psychopathic persons to enrich themselves.
Along the same lines, in an article published by the Associated Press in December,
Will Durant, philosopher-historian asks:
Have we too much freedom? Have we so
long ridiculed authority in the family, discipline in education, rules in art, decency in
conduct, and law in the state that our liberation has brought us close to chaos in the
family and the school, in morals, arts, ideas,
and government? We forgot to make ourselves intelligent when we made ourselves
free.
Should we be free to sell, to any minor
who has the price, the most obscene-the
most deliberately and mercenarily obscene
-book of the eighteenth century, while we
deplore the spread of crime, unwed motherhood, and venereal disease among our youth?
Dr. Durant states that public opinion has
been guilty of criminal and cowardly silence
in the face of growing crime, moral disorder,
and deteriorating taste. We have been afraid
to speak out lest we be considered oldfashioned and incapable of adjusting ourselves to changing norms and ways.
We tolerate and allow our children to be
formed by pictures that habituate them to
crime and violence, to the cheap heroism
of flaunting a gun. We give not only money
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but honors to writers who peddle sexual
stimulation.
He ends with the request that we speak
out: "Let us say, humbly and publicly, that
we resent corruption in politics, dishonesty
in business, faithlessness in marriage, pornography in literature, meaninglessness in
art."
Human Rights
Reverend Albert Verdoodt writing in the
December issue of MigrationNews presents
a scholarly critique of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the occasion
of the fifteenth anniversary of its adoption
by the General Assembly of the United
Nations.
Father Verdoodt first gives a brief description of the Declaration. He compares it
to the vast portico of a temple of which the
parvis is formed by the Preamble affirming
the unity of the human family and of which
the foundation is constituted by the general
principles of liberty, equality, nondiscrimination and fraternity proclaimed in articles
1 and 2. Four columns of equal importance
support the portico.
The first is that of rights and liberties of
a personal order (articles 3 to 11 included):
life, liberty, security and dignity of person,
equal protection of the law, guarantees
against slavery, torture, arbitrary arrest and
detention, and legal recourse in case of
violation. The second column concerns the
rights of the individual in his relationship
with groups of which he is a member and
things of the exterior world (articles 12 to
17 included). Man and woman on an equal
footing have the right to get married, to
found a family, to have a home, a residence,
and asylum in case of persecution. Every
human being has the right to be a member
of a city, to be a citizen of a country, and to
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manage what has become his own property.
The third pillar is that of spiritual faculties, public liberties and fundamental political rights (articles 18 to 22 included):
freedom of thought, conscience and religion:
freedom of opinion, expression, assembly,
association; the right to take part in public
affairs, and to participate in periodical and
real elections. The will of the people is
proclaimed the basis of authority of government.
The fourth pillar, symmetrical to the first,
the strength of which is equal to the others,
is that of economic, social and cultural
rights (articles 22 to 27 included): right to
work, free choice of employment, social
security, freedom of trade union; right to
education, to leisure, to cultural life, and to
the protection of intellectual and artistic
creation.
On these four columns a facade had to be
set to mark the links between society and
the individual. Articles 28 to 30 affirm the
necessity of an international social order so
that the rights and freedoms of the person
may have their full effect. They also proclaim the existence of the duties of the
individual toward the community, they fix
the bounds beyond which man cannot go;
he has duties to the community, he should
respect the rights and freedoms of others;
he cannot make attempts against the just
requirements of morality, public order and
well-being in a democratic society, nor
against the aims and principles of the United
Nations. Thus does the Declaration mark a
continuous movement from the individual
toward the social.
Father Verdoodt then asks:
Considering that "Pacem in Terris" is at the
same time more complete and possesses a
sounder philosophical basis than the United
Nations Declaration, which should satisfy
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both Western and Marxist concepts, should
a Catholic come to the conclusion that the
Declaration of 1948 does not deserve so
much honor?

Declaration of Human Rights may really
contribute to their coming soon-to say it
again in the terms used in Pacem in Terris:

It does not seem so. In fact, John XXIII
does not hesitate to declare in his last
Encyclical that,

the day when the United Nations Organization will effectively guarantee the rights of
the human being which derive directly from
our natural dignity and which for this reason are universal, inviolate and inalienable.

an act of the highest importance performed
by the United Nations Organization was the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights....
Some objections and reservations were
raised regarding certain points in the Declaration. There is no doubt however, that
the document represents an important step
on the path towards the juridical-political
organization of the world community....
The Pope does not specify what these
reservations are. There is one, however,
which is easily discerned. Article 16, paragraph 3 of the Declaration without expressing a direct opinion on the dissolubility of
marriage, implies it indirectly in mentioning
the "equal rights" of the spouses "during
the marriage and at its dissolution." This
wording has nevertheless the merit of excluding the unilateral repudiation accepted
by traditional Moslem law. But for the rest,
one must recognize that this is the very first
time that a document of the Church acclaims a declaration of human rights so
solemnly. The main reason would seem to
be, from the context, that the Declaration
may form the common denominator, the
ground for an understanding where men of
different ideologies can meet. Already in
Man and the State Jacques Maritain wrote
that "men presently opposed in their theoretical concepts may arrive at a purely practical agreement on the enumeration of
human rights." Consequently, let us hope
that the celebration of the fifteenth anniversary of the proclamation of the Universal

Religious Freedom
The December 21. issue of the London
Tablet contains an admirable summary of
the schema on religious freedom which will
be considered at sometime in the future by
the Ecumenical Council. It also features the
comments of Father John Courtney Murray
on the subject made at the time the schema
was introduced.
The two texts discussed are Chapter Five
of the Decree on Ecumenism, entitled On
Religious Freedom and the lengthy relatio
of Bishop de Smedt of Bruges, Belgium. The
latter document was, in a sense, the more
important. The doctrine in the text was
identical with the doctrine expressed in
Pacem in Terris. The text represented the
end of a lengthy development of theological
thought on the matter, and the Encyclical
confirmed the validity of this development.
There were two essential points of doctrine: first, every man by right of nature
(iure naturae) had the right to the free exercise of religion in society according to the
dictates of his personal conscience, and this
right belonged essentially to the dignity of
the human person as such; and secondly, the
juridical consequences of this were that an
obligation fell on other men in society, and
upon the state in particular to acknowledge
this personal right, to respect it in practice,
and to promote its free exercise.
Bishop de Smedt gave four reasons for
the proclamation of this doctrine, all of
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them deriving from the concrete situation
of the world today. First, it is necessary
today to state the true doctrine of the
Church with regard to religious freedom in
society, since the doctrine had been clarified
by theological reflection and political experience over the past few generations. Secondly, it is
necessary today for the Church to assume
a universal patronage of the dignity of the
human person and of man's essential freedons, in an age in which totalitarian tyranny has imposed itself upon nearly half of
the human race.
Thirdly, we are living in the age of the
religiously pluralist society, where men of
all religions and of no religion have to live
together, and it is therefore necessary for
the Church to show the way to justice and
peace in society. Finally, we are living in
an age of ecumenical hope, and the only
path to Christian unity lies along the road
of social, civil, political and religious freedom.
The relatio then cleared up the misconceptions with regard to religious freedom
which had been the heritage of the nineteenth-century conflict between the Church
and the laic ideology issuing from the
Enlightenment and the French Revolution:
namely, religious freedom did not mean
that the human conscience was not bound
by any divine laws but only by such norms
as it individually created for itself; nor did it
mean that all religions were equally true or
equally false, nor that there was any objective criterion of truth.
The decree undertook to define the attitude that Catholics ought to maintain and
exhibit towards all men. This was based on
the Catholic doctrine with regard to the
necessary freedom of the act of Christian
faith:
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God our Father through Christ our Lord
spoke freely to men His word of salvation,
which is a word of truth and love, an invitation to an interpersonal relationship between man and the one God, living and true,
who is Father, Son and Holy Spirit. God's
word was freely spoken; it is for man to
respond to it freely. The response, whether
acceptance or rejection, is a matter of personal responsibility. No man may abdicate
this responsibility. No man may assume this
responsibility for another, but only for himself ....

Hence no man, and certainly no

Christian, may bring to bear any kind of
coercion, physical or moral or legal, on another. This would be to contravene the
essential law of the divine economy of salvation, which is that men must accept God's
gift of grace freely, or not at all. Therefore
the theology of the act of faith obliges
Christians to an attitude of respect and reverence toward others who do not share their
faith. This is not religious indifferentism.
One does not affirm that truth and error are
equal in the sight of God. One must, how-

ever, affirm the dignity of the human person
and the freedom of the act of personal religious decision.
Though Father Courtney Murray thought
the conception of religious freedom contained in the text was true as far as it went,
he did not think it adequate:
One must have in mind that it will be the
duty of the Council to establish the formula
"religious freedom" within the Christian
vocabulary, to define or describe its full
sense and meaning, and to do this in such a
way that there may be at least general agreement among Christians.
The difficult area was the place of religious
freedom in society. What were the principles
according to which the social exercise of the
right to religious freedom might be justly
and legitimately limited? What was the competence of civil government in regard to
the exercise of the right? What were the
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canons of jurisprudence that must control
the use of the coercive weapon of law in this
most sensitive field? In his opinion the
decree was not sufficiently clear in its dealing with these questions of the social and
legal limitations of the right to religious
freedom: questions that were awkward, but
which could not be avoided. Rightly, it
asserted that the right was subject to some
legitimate restrictions. But it said that these
restrictions might be imposed in the name
of the common good, or in the name of the
rights of others. This, Father John Courtney
Murray thought, was too vague. An appeal
to the common good
may be no more than the invocation of a
raison d'6tat, which is dangerous doctrine.
Moreover, the allegation of the rights of
others... may be no more than a veiled
invocation of the rights of the majority,
which is again a dangerous doctrine.
The relatio had been somewhat more
satisfactory. It made clear that the primary
element in the common good consisted in
the
legal protection and promotion of the whole
order of personal rights and freedoms
which are proper to the human person as
such. Therefore the relatio also makes clear
that an infringement of the personal right
of man, including notably his right to religious freedom, cannot be justified by an
appeal to the common good. Such an infringement of personal rights would be a
violation of the common good itself.
He thought, however, that a further step
should be taken and the political principle
invoked that political authority is incompetent in the field of religion, particularly
when there is question of religion in society.
This principle, which asserts the incompetence of secular political authority in the
field of religion, is deeply imbedded in the
true political tradition of the Christian West.

It is also affirmed within the theological
tradition of the Church.
It was true that the principle had been
obscured in Europe for centuries, but the
true tradition was preserved in the American constitutional system.
The relatio also dealt with the theological
problem that the affirmation of Pacem in
Terris with regard to the right to religious
freedom, and the juridical consequences of
this right seemed at first sight to be directly
contrary to certain utterances of the Church
in the nineteenth century. The problem had
been dealt with in the only legitimate way:
by regarding it as a problem of true and
genuine development, both in the doctrine
of the Church and in her pastoral solicitude
for the dignity and freedom of man.
Finally, two questions faced the Council:
whether the Church should
extend her pastoral solicitude beyond her
own boundaries and assume an active patronage of the freedom of the human person, who was created by God as His image,
who was redeemed by the blood of Christ,
who stands today under a massive threat to
everything that human dignity and personal
freedom mean.., and whether the assumption of this universal pastoral solicitude was
warranted or grounded in the doctrinal tradition of the Church?
Father Murray thought that the answer must
be affirmative, if only "the tradition of the
Church is understood to be what it is,
namely, a tradition of growth in fuller understanding of the truth."
Insanity and Responsibility
Readers of The Catholic Lawyer who
were attracted by the topics covered in the
symposium on Mental Disease and Criminal
Responsibility,which appeared in 1958, will
be equally interested in a recent article on
the M'Naghten Rules printed in the Decem-
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ber 1963 issue of The Record- a magazine
published by the New York City Bar Association. Written by Justice Samuel Hofstadter
and Miss Shirley Levittan, the article argues
in favor of retaining the M'Naghten Rules
in face of recent trends to the contrary.
Basically, the imposition of legal sanctions on criminals is now regarded as having
at least three purposes: (1) isolation of the
offender to prevent criminal conduct by him
during his imprisonment; (2) deterrence of
others with tendencies toward the same type
of criminal conduct and deterrence of the
offender after release; and (3) rehabilitation
by appropriate means whenever possible.
In all events, society must and is entitled
to protect itself against a repetition of
offense. The prime objective having been
accomplished, the law may thereafter, and,
then, only, address itself to considerations
affecting the individual. Hence, whatever the
mainspring of an anti-social act, the perpetrator must be rendered beyond the capacity
to renew it.
The difficulty with recurrent efforts at a
reformulation of the M'Naghten Rules, so
the article states, is that they do not start
with a reorientation of the frame of reference of the problem. They blur the three
objectives of legal judgment to which we
have already adverted. And if we add a
fourth objective urged by some respectable
students of the subject, i.e., society's vindication of its norms of conduct, confusion
becomes yet more confounded.
To deal with the problem of insanity in
the present climate of enlightened legal
processes, sociological impulses and medical
learning (especially in the field of psychiatry which is still in a state of seminal development), requires getting away entirely
from abstract principles, and, more immediately, procedures heretofore obtaining. This
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means that a mere attempt at verbal redefinition of criminal responsibility is doomed
to failure. We must start with society's effecting its various purposes - by the agency
of law. It will appear at once that a reformulation alone by a judge to a jury of what
insanity exculpates is a futility. To give
meaning - and substance - to any formulation requires a different frame of procedure.
To attempt to square the circle by semantic
acrobatics, however well-intentioned, will
not avail.
Rather than fuse, in whole or in part,
the medical and legal approach with their
divergent points of view, we must separate
them by establishing the sequence in the
application of the principles which complect
these disciplines.
To this end the authors propose that when
a defendant who has pleaded insanity is
found guilty of the act charged after a trial
based on the conventional rules now obtaining, i.e., the M'Naghten Rules, he shall not
be sentenced by the judge presiding at the
trial but his disposition shall be relegated to
a wholly separate and different forum from
that of the trial court. Such a forum would
be a Board of Disposition composed of
judicial, medical and lay representation. It
would consider all evidence, medical, scientific and sociological, including additional
facts not adduced - or even admissible - at
the trial, as a basis for the final judgment
of disposition. After such a hearing, the
Board would determine whether, in the case
of a capital offense, the death penalty should
apply, whether the accused should be sentenced to serve his term in a correctional
institution, or whether he should be confined
for treatment and custody to a mental institution - and for what period and on what
conditions.
The very existence of such a Board thus
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constituted enables the formulation of a
new departure in the law: the adjudication
and confinement as "criminally insane" of a
person with a history of repeated convictions for anti-social behavior before he has
committed the extreme and final act of violence. It is the corollary proposal of the
authors that when one charged with a crime
has a history of repeated criminal convictions, and, in due course, is thereafter convicted of the immediate crime charged, the
trial court should be empowered, on its own
motion or on the recommendation of the
jury, instead of immediately sentencing the
defendant, to refer him to a Board of
Disposition. The Board would determine
whether he is an habitual criminal whose
mental processes, however perverted, cannot be deemed defective - in which case he
would be returned to the trial court for
sentencing; or whether he should be adjudicated as "criminally insane" and ordered
confined to a special mental institution from which he may be released only by
procedures as deliberate as those by which
he was confined.
The M'Naghten formula has been criticized as not consonant with modern psychiatry. But "insanity" as a defense in criminal
act'ons must remain primarily a legal and
not a medical concept. The fundamental
question is not what is medical insanity but
rather what is legal responsibility. There is
no disease-"insanity." There are gradations
of mental imbalance and impairment. The
rule of law must provide practical guidelines
for the determination -by the jury- of the
point in mental imbalance at which the
defendant can no longer be considered responsible for his criminal act. Those who
criticize the M'Naghten Rules base their opposition on the wholly specious premise that
the problem is primarily medical rather than

a moral one embodied in the law. They take
exception to the rules on the philosophic
ground that they are based on concepts of
"right" and "wrong" belonging to the realm
of ethics - but should be based on medicine
which is scientific. For these very reasons,
however, the authors argue that the
M'Naghten Rules are intrinsically sound.
They do not purport to be based on medical
criteria: their orientation is the social imperative of personal responsibility. They are not
merely technical formulae articulated by
the nineteenth-century legal mind. While
given formulation a century ago, their underlying philosophy dates back not only to
Aristotle and Plato but beyond that to the
Biblical tradition-the twin sources of western civilization. It is essential pragmatically
and even philosophically that the focal point
of juridical determination remain the ultimate question of responsibility. For in our
existential age, every man is held responsible for his own fate, and, as Satre said, man
is condemned to be free. The M'Naghten
Rules articulate this semantically - and legally. The doctrine which they embody can
safely remain the fountainhead of the law.
The authors conclude by stating that
so long as present procedures obtain, the
M'Naghten Rules, as complemented by
legislation providing for wide latitude in
psychiatric testimony and implemented by
enlightened application, are the surest guidelines in determining whether a defendant is
to be exculpated for mental incapacity.
However, doctrinaire prepossession may
not be suffered to bar advances in the law
and its processes. Hence, they propose that
if the defendant were found "not guilty by
reason of insanity" he would be committed.
If he were found guilty, the defendant would
be referred to a Board of Disposition. On
the basis of comprehensive information, the
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Board would determine whether the defendant should be incarcerated in a penal institution (or, in a capital offense, if the death
penalty should be imposed) or whether the
defendant should be confined to a mental
institution. A trial under the M'Naghten
Rules is within the ambit of conventional
justice. The proceedings before the Board
allow for the expression of a humane disposition to compassion, if such is indicated.
Righteousness which exalts a society contemplates mercy. But it also contemplates
judgment, i.e., the application of justice.
The impulse to compassion, however
exalted in nature, is enacted by human
faculties. As in every other phenomenon,
however, it must conform to the rule of
causality-in the law, this is ordered reason.
The truly ethical must be stern when
necessary, even as it is merciful when indicated. For instance, the Ancient law proscribed the return of a fugitive slave to his
master but commanded the return of a fugitive criminal to the authority of the State.
And the sympathy which is so universal that
it fails to distinguish "between the oppressor
and the oppressed" is sheer sentimentality,
according to a medieval jurist who was also
a great saint -he held that such "mercy
on sinners is cruelty to all creatures."
Pacem in Terris
The various objections to the late Pope
John's encyclical on peace and world order,
are effectively presented and answered in a
recent, well-written article by Father Donald
Campion in the February issue of Catholic
Mind.
According to Father Campion whatever
the merits that so many saw in the encyclical, one could anticipate hearing voices of
dissent raised against it. With considerable
insight, a group of French experts, gathered
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for a discussion of the new papal letter
shortly after its publication, pointed to the
major sources from which criticism of the
Pope and of his teaching would come.
Briefly, they identified the following five
groups.
1. Some fundamentalist or strongly conservative Protestant groups would be likely
-to reject the encyclical's optimism about
man's capacity to order human society in
any truly moral sense. (This prediction was
quickly verified in the United States when
the pronouncedly conservative Protestant
journal Christianity Today set forth its respectful but highly critical editorial judgment on Pacem in Terris, a judgment which
found the encyclical wanting on precisely
this score of un-Christian optimism.)
2. Protestant intellectuals of another
school, together with many secular scholars,
would balk at the Pope's insistent stress on
natural law as a point of departure in the
ordering of human society or for the identification and defense of human rights. (This
was precisely the note struck by two such
distinguished Protestant scholars as Dean
John C. Bennett and Reinhold Niebuhr in
their comments on the encyclical for Christianity and Crisis.)
3. Certain nationalist groups in various
countries could be expected to object to the
papal support for a true world community
and a corresponding world authority having
some measure of standing over the NationStates.
4. Some of the more rigidly doctrinaire
Marxist circles expressed objection.
5. Some other elements, largely of the
political right, and largely Catholic, also
voiced criticism. (A few of these voices had
early been raised against the encyclical on
the basis of advance rumors concerning its
contents; others had been conducting a
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campaign of complaint against Vatican policies toward the Communist nations for some
time, e.g., in the pages of 1I Borghese of
Milan or of the National Review.)
In reply to the above and further objections, Father Campion states as follows:
"1. There are those who have registered
disappointment over specific items or aspects in the document, e.g., the Pope's 'failure' to spell out a judgment on nuclear arms
and atomic war in terms of the traditional
'just war' theory. A Canon Drinkwater in
England, to be sure, could conclude that
the Pope's words on the subject 'can only
mean that atomic warfare is not morally
lawful.' Yet, Dr. Howard Schomer, head of
a Protestant theological seminary in Chicago, writing in the ChristianCentury, could
remark that 'on no topic is... updating more
clearly required than on the ancient theological doctrine of the "just war" and the
resultant practice of the Church toward
conscientious objectors.'
Personally, I incline to the view of some
European Catholics, including the French
Jesuit author on international relations, Fr.
Robert Bosc. These see the Pope passing
over in silence the theoretical distinction between a just and an unjust war. They go on
to ask whether this is not simply because he
recognizes that wars between nations have
today become sociologically inadmissible
(as had proved true centuries ago in the
instance of wars between feudal lords), and
that, thus, the issue of moral justification is
no longer a real one. This is not to say that
the conceptual framework of the 'just war'
theory should be junked entirely. Its application may well prove necessary and fruitful
in the larger task of rendering judgment on
the exercise of power, in the sense of physical force, by an international authority.

2. Of a different nature are some more
general complaints. These, as I noted above,
have been directed in some instances to
concrete actions of the Vatican in regard to
the Kremlin and other Communist powers.
The critics I refer to here would arrive at
different prudential judgments on some of
these policies, and on some of the orientations suggested by Pacem in Terris. Thus,
Max Ascoli, for example, writing in the
Reporter, would observe that the Pope 'has
taken a gigantic risk for his Church - and
not only for his Church.'
Here also, one should -perhaps include
Robert Strausz-Hup6, who commented in
the pages of the Washington Post that, if the
encyclical's remark about the possibility of
a 'drawing nearer together' with opposing
ideological groups means that 'the Church
must come to terms, as it has done in
Poland, with a tyrannical regime, then this
advice can pass for a practical, although
perhaps unheroic, formula for survival.' I
judge from his remark that Prof. StrauszHup6 would reject this.
3. Yet another type of objection along
general lines came from critics represented
in this country by some writers in the National Review. Frank S. Meyer would seem
to suggest that Pope John stands guilty of 'a
supine refusal to carry out our moral responsibility to separate, as best we can in
this world, right from wrong and to challenge the onrushing evil.' And, in a passage
which leaves one wondering how carefully
the same writer read the encyclical, he
queries: 'Why, with all the references to the
encyclicals of his recent predecessors, is
there none to Divini Redemptoris of Pius
XI?' (For the record, one can find the encyclical Divini Redemptoris cited explicitly in
footnotes 39, 46 and 47 of Pacem in
Terris.)
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Even more blunt is James Burnham,
writing in the same publication, who answers his own quesion: 'Why is theVatican
putting forward a policy of peaceful coexistence?' He sees two possible explanations: 1) The Vatican may actually be deceived about the nature of the Communist
enterprise and may actually believe that a
modus vivendi can be reached with them;
2) the Vatican may have cynically concluded that the West is finished and that the
Church must prepare itself for coming to
terms with the new Caesar.
4. Possibly the most intriguing of Communist reservations concerning Pope John's
encyclical appeared in the guise of an editor's note added to an abridged version of
the encyclical when it was published in
the Moscow weekly Za Rubezhom: 'The
Editorial Board considers it necessary to
emphasize that many statements of the
encyclical are derived from the principles
of the Catholic creed, which is incompatible
with the solely scientific Marxist Weltanschauung.' One is tempted to find in this
cautionary note some evidence that the
editors in question foresaw the possibility
described by Fr. John F. Cronin when he
observed that 'the Church must reject communism as a system. But individual Communist leaders can change, as reason and
common sense force them to a more correct
view of human nature and society. The Pope
is seeking, gently, gradually and prudently,
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to encourage such change.'
5. There remains, finally, that group referred to in an irreverent manner by the
British New Statesman when it remarked
that 'like Khrushchev, Pope John has his
hands full in keeping his "Chinese" in order.'
The reference, of course, is to the 'ultras'
among Catholics in many countries. I shall
content myself with noting here that their
approach to a document such as Pacem in
Terris is often as ingenious as it is misguided. Perhaps, we will see someday an
attempt to 'demythologize' this encyclical
through a process comparable to that employed by a Catholic priest writing about
Pope John's Mater et Magistra in the June
issue of an American clerical journal, the
Homiletic and Pastoral Review. His basic
approach was to convey the impression that
a sensible, original document had been
drafted by the Pope's 'officially designated
authors,' but that this text somehow became
corrupted in 'a sort of shadowland' prior to
actual publication. (This priest critic generously allows that the Pope is to be judged
more the victim than the culprit when one
assesses the blame for aberrations in the
encyclical - aberrations here meaning, of
course, the sections the critic doesn't like.)
This interesting example of experimentation
with the methodology of Formgeschichte
criticism is, of course, another proof of the
essential radicalism of some conservative
mentalities."

